This study analyses family versus non-family firm returns under different legal environments Shareholders of bidder family firms value better the M&A announcement compared to nonfamily firm shareholders. Cumulative Average Abnormal Return, in (-2,+2), is 1.18% for the whole sample, 2.82% for family firms and 0.92% for non-family firms. Family ownership is a positive factor in bidder shareholder M&A valuation in environments with higher shareholder protection, better accounting standards, greater financial development (GDP) and better corruption control. JEL Codes: G30; G32; G34; F30.
Introduction
Competition for market share influences firm strategy, with M&As being one of the main ways for firms to grow, yet also supposing an important challenge for family firms. Empirical research shows mixed results in relation to firm wealth creation after an M&A announcement.
Moreover, differences in M&A market valuation between family and non-family firms, as well as the influence of the legal environment, are incipient topics. These are the motivations and research objectives of this paper.
The database to test the theoretical proposals considers Mergers and Acquisitions for
European listed firms over the [2002] [2003] [2004] period, distinguishing between family and nonfamily firms, with target firms being worldwide public or private firms. We will compare bidder shareholder wealth creation between family and non-family firm M&As, using event study methodology and multivariate analysis and controlling by the differences in the legal environment of the countries of acquiring and acquired firms. This paper will also present a database which includes not only domestic operations, but cross-border ones as well, and also analyzes unlisted firm acquisition. In contrast with other research studies which consider exclusively European firms, or only American firms, or exclusively listed firms, or only financial or non-financial firms.
We have structured the paper into the following sections: in the second section, we analyze the precedents in the financial literature related to shareholder M&A valuation, as well as the influence of the legal and institutional environment, and propose the hypotheses under study;
in the third section, we present the database and descriptive statistics; in the fourth section, we summarize the results of the analysis of abnormal returns and their differences according to the legal and institutional environment; in the fifth section, we carry out a multi-variant analysis of abnormal return determinants; and, in the sixth and final section, we present our conclusions.
Firm acquisition valuation: Research background
One of the reasons motivating this research is that the results found in empirical studies on the acquiring-firm shareholders valuation are contradictory. While research studies agree on the positive valuation that acquired-firm shareholders make, the same does not occur when analyzing the valuation of acquiring-firm shareholders. Some studies conclude that acquiringfirm shareholders negatively value the announcement of an M&A, 1 while others obtain positive abnormal returns. 2 To reflect upon the reasons for these divergences, it is necessary to examine the differences in the analyzed databases, as well as to study the relevance of the characteristics of the firms involved and the transactions. Among the former studies, concerning firms listed in the USA, Travlos (1987) obtains a cumulative abnormal return for the acquiring firm of -1.6% when payment is made in shares of stock and of -0.13% when in cash. For the USA, Chang (1998) reports a cumulative abnormal return of 0.09% when unlisted firms are acquired and payment is in cash, and -0.02% when the target firms are listed. When the transaction payment is in shares of stock, the abnormal return takes the value of 2.64%, if the target firm is unlisted, and -2.46%, if listed.
The increase in merger and acquisition operations in the European market since the 1990s allows for comparing results with those of the American market. Several papers focus on acquisitions carried out by European financial firms, such as Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000), who report positive abnormal returns of 0.99% for acquiring-firm shareholders, although there are those who obtain negative cumulative returns: Beitel et al. (2002) , -0.01% for operations in any part of the world; Campa and Hernando (2006) , -0.87% for European operations; or Hagendorff et al. (2007) , -0.32% for European and American financial firms. In the USA, studies with databases starting from the 1980s or 90s again obtain diverse results:
Mulherin and Boone (2000), -0.37 %; Walker (2000) , -0.30% for non-financial firms; and
DeLong (2001), -1.68%, while Moeller et al. (2004) obtain abnormal returns of 1.10% and Fuller et al. (2002) , 1.77% for non-financial firms.
Acquiring-shareholder valuation determinants: transaction and firm characteristics
A review of studies undertaken to date underscores the following characteristics of the transactions and firms involved as determinants for acquiring-shareholder valuation: a) Method of payment. If management considers that the shares of their firm are overvalued, they will prefer to pay an M&A operation in shares of stock. Thus, the announcement of an acquisition paid in shares of stock will be a negative sign to the acquiring-firm shareholders and therefore valued negatively (Myers and Majluf, 1984) . On the other hand, they will positively value payment in cash (Travlos, 1987; Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003) .
b) Friendly vs hostile takeover. Hostile takeovers raise the price paid for the target firm, which determines a negative acquiring-firm shareholder valuation (Schwert, 1996; Gregory, 1997; Schwert, 2000; Campa and Hernando, 2004) .
c) Focus vs diversification.
Empirical studies obtain mixed results regarding M&A valuation which implies the diversification of business focus. Jensen and Ruback (1983) , Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) , Campa and Kedia (2002) , and Raj and Forsyth (2002) associate wealth creation to M&As which diversify, while Morck, Sheleifer and Visnhny (1990), Lang and Stulz (1994) , Berger and Ofek (1995) , and Maquieria et al. (1998) conclude that diversification diminishes acquiring-shareholder wealth due to the fact that management tends to overpay. (Harford, 1999) , and therefore that their shareholders negatively value the announcement. Lang, Stulz and Walking (1989) show that firms with a high market-to-book ratio obtain high abnormal returns around the acquisition announcement, while Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson and Teoh (2006) find to the contrary, which leads them to consider the ratio as a proxy for overvaluation.
f) Size of acquiring firm. The greater separation between ownership and control, which tends to exist in large firms, may favor managerial interest in M&As, even though this be overpaid (managerial hubris hypothesis, Roll, 1986) , motivating a worse valuation on the part of the acquiring-firm shareholders (Schewert, 2000 , Beitel et al., 2004 , Moeller, 2004 .
g) Relative size of the target firm. On the one hand, the larger the target firm is, the more information there will be on the firm, as well as less adverse selection problems in their valuation (Asquith, Bruner and Mullins, 1983) . On the other hand, however, this will generate higher integration costs between the two firms (Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker, 1992), which acquiring-firm shareholders will value negatively. 
Bidder ownership structure: family vs non-family firms
Bidder ownership structure and its influence on the wealth creation surrounding an M&A is an aspect which has yet to receive attention. However, studies do relate family or non-family ownership structure to firm performance.
tunneling) (Johnson, La Porta, López-Silanes and Shleifer, 2000) . Tunneling may refer to excessive compensation for family positions in the firm, advantageous transfer prices or loans, loan guarantees, or M&A operations that enhance the value of other owned companies. We call this hypothesis "family-firm opportunism in M&As".
B)
On the other hand, family firms may be characterized by long-term perspectives, given their interest in transferring the business on to future generations (James, 1999 It is our aim to test these contradictory hypotheses.
Influence of the legal and institutional environment on merger-acquisition valuation
The analysis of ownership structure influence on M&A market valuation should also bear in mind that ownership structures differ across countries and depend on the legal and institutional environment. English (common law) countries are characterized by greater shareholder protection and a more disperse ownership structure, with agency problems arising especially from management-shareholder conflicts of interest. However, in continental Europe (civil law, differentiating between French, German and Scandinavian models), less legal protection of minority shareholders determines more concentrated ownership structures, so that the most relevant agency problems are those associated with the possible wealth expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling shareholders (La Porta, López-deSilanes, Shleifer and Visnhy, 1997).
This study aims to examine whether shareholder M&A valuation depends on the legal and institutional environment. We consider that two contrasting types of hypotheses may be established and will later examine in our empirical analysis which of these predominates.
1) On the one hand, the "poorer" institutional environment of an acquired firm (low minority shareholder protection, poor accounting standards, low creditor protection, less developed capital markets, highly concentrated ownership, poor corruption control) will determine a market with "less" active and "less" competitive corporate control. In this environment, the likelihood of finding undervalued target firms increases. Thus, bidder wealth appropriation will be valued positively by acquiring shareholders (Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Starks and Wei, 2004; Hagendorff et al., 2007; Bris and Cabolis, 2008; Martynova and Renneboog, 2008) . Furthermore, the target firm will adopt better corporate governance practices and will show greater degrees of transparency and shareholder protection, which will allow the acquiring firm to pay a lower price in the takeover (Starks and Wei, 2004; Bris and Cabolis, 2008; Martynova and Renneboog, 2008) .
2) On the other hand, target firms in a "poorer" legal and institutional environment may generate problems and decrease the value of the M&A. Low minority shareholder protection, poor accounting standards, higher ownership concentration, poor corruption control, poor creditor protection and less developed capital markets hinder acquisition negotiations and increase the risk of operating in these countries.
Therefore, a negative M&A valuation will be expected on the part of the acquiring shareholders (Dahlquist, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson, 2003; Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005) .
Furthermore, large shareholders, like families, may extract private benefits more easily from minority shareholders, for example, after an M&A in legal environments with poor protection for minority shareholders (Ben-Amar and André, 2006). Higher benefits of control would be associated with less developed capital markets, more concentrated ownership and, in general, a worse legal and institutional environment. In contrast, family ownership may positively influence firm value in legal environments with greater minority shareholder protection (Maury, 2006) .
Database
The aim of this research study is to verify the previously expounded hypotheses and In order to classify firms as family or non-family, we checked ownership data in Thomson
One Banker, Lexis Nexis, the company annual report, the company website and the stock exchange in the country of each firm. 33 firms do not have information about shareholder structure available in any of those sources. The remaining 143 firms are classified as family firms when the major shareholder is a family group or an individual, being non-family firms otherwise. 45 firms are classified as family (31%) and 98 as non-family firms (61%). Table 1 shows M&A distribution according to the geographical area of both the acquiring and target firm. 31.25% of all operations are carried out in the United Kingdom. Domestic transactions in Sweden (6.81%) and France (6.25%) are also noteworthy. + 33 firms could not be classified, as family or non-family, due to the unavailability of their ownership data. Table 2 shows the transaction distribution depending on whether the acquiring firm is a family or non-family firm. Panel A refers to the characteristics of the transaction, according to payment method, whether the M&A is hostile or friendly, whether the acquisition has the same business focus or, to the contrary, represents a diversification, and whether it is domestic or cross-border. Panel B classifies operations according to whether or not the target firm lists on the market and the acquiring firm has had previous participation in the target firm. We do not observe differences between family and non-family firms regarding the percentage which each type of operation represents. 76% of the target firms do not list on the Table 3 includes the statistical descriptions for the entire M&A dataset, distinguishing between family and non-family firms as well as between domestic and cross-border M&As.
Sample description
The differences between family and non-family firms are not statistically significant. Neither are they between domestic and cross-border operations, except for larger size in reference to the target firm (transaction value, in millions of US dollars, divided by the acquiring firm market value four weeks prior to the operation, in millions of US dollars), greater cash flow availability and the greater weight of private target firms in domestic transactions. *,*** significant at the 10% and the 1% level. Table 4 shows the number of operations in the database, classifying them in accordance with the legal system of both the acquiring and target firm countries. Following La Porta et al.
(1998), we classify countries by the subsequent system: English (common law) and German, Scandinavian, French, and communist (civil law). In the sample there is no transaction in a country with a communist legal system. The greatest number of operations takes place among countries with the same legal system. Note should be taken of the number of transactions carried out among firms pertaining to the English legal system (74 transactions out of the 176 which make up the sample), that is to say, those belonging a strong shareholder protection environment. 
Acquiring firm shareholder valuation
We shall now examine the valuation that capital markets make of M&As, following the event study methodology. We estimate abnormal returns at around the transaction announcement date.
We obtain M&A announcement dates from Thomson One Banker and Lexis Nexis. We calculate the abnormal return for each announcement (AR) in the event window (-20, +20) as the difference between daily returns and expected returns according to the market model, estimated in the period (-200, -21) before the announcement date. Datastream provides the daily return index for each firm, adjusted by dividends and splits. This return index allows estimating daily return. We follow the method of Dodd and Warner (1983) and Corrado (1989) for small sample size in order to verify the existence of significant daily abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). Table 5 ***, **, *: significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
Bidder shareholder valuation according to transaction characteristics
In accordance with the aim of this paper, we will now analyze the valuation made by shareholders in more detail. We examine the differences in said valuation, comparing family and non-family firms, according to whether the target firm is public or private, and discriminating by whether the transaction is domestic or cross-border and by method of payment. Table 6 shows the Cumulative Average Abnormal Return for bidder shareholders in (-2, +2).
The difference between the CAAR for family and non-family firms is not statistically significant, as neither is the difference in the CAAR for domestic and cross-border M&As. As regards the method of payment, and in accordance with other studies, the CAAR is positive, 
Cross-border transaction valuation according to differences in the institutional environment
In this section we contemplate the analysis of cross-border transactions, considering the characteristics of the legal and institutional environment of both the acquiring and the target firm. The variables which we take into consideration for each country are the following:
shareholder protection, accounting standards, corruption control, ownership concentration, GDP per capita and creditor protection.
a) The degree of shareholder protection (PSHAREHOLDER). We define this following Rossi and Volpin (2004) and Hagendorff et al. (2007) and multiply the revised antidirector index (La Porta et al., 2008) by a measure of the rule of law which rates the law-and-order tradition (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2007) .
b) The quality of accounting standards (ACCOUNT). We use the index from the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research (La Porta et al., 1999 . (1998) as the average of the participation of the three major shareholders in the ten largest, privately-owned, non-financial firms in each country. e) Corruption control (CCORR). Variable defined by Kaufmann, et al. (2007) for the control which a country's political system exercises to avoid distortions in the economic and financial environment, inefficiency in government and business, and instability in the political processes which obstruct foreign investment.
f) Creditor protection (PCREDITOR). We multiply the creditor rights index defined by Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2003) , proxy for the possibility of debt financing, by the measure of legal efficiency (rule of law ). Table 7 shows the Cumulative Average Abnormal Return for bidder shareholders according to the differences between the respective institutional environments of the acquiring and the target firm. This univariate analysis only obtains significant cumulative returns for domestic transactions or between firms from countries with the same legal and institutional environment. Neither do we observe significant differences when we compare family and non-family cumulative returns. However, before reaching any conclusions, in the following section we will carry out a multivariate analysis, which will allow us to take all the possible determinants into consideration as a whole. 
Panel A :Shareholder protection
Greater in bidder country (1) Equal (2) Less in bidder country (3) (1)- (2) (2)- (3) (1)- (3) 0.79%
1.22%
(3.69***) (2.69***)
1.85% a (2.00*) (N=20) (p=0.41) (p=0.67) (p=0.14)
Panel B: Accounting Standards
Higher in bidder country (1) Equal (2) Lower in bidder country (3) (1)- (2) (2)- (3) (1)- (3) 1.32% 
Panel E: Corruption control
Greater in bidder country (1) Equal (2) Less in bidder country (3) (1)- (2) (2)- (3) (1)- (3) 0.78% *, **, ***: statistically significant at the 90%, 95 % and 99 % confidence level, respectively. a: the results are not shown due to the reduced size of the sub-sample.
Determinants of bidder abnormal returns
After the above univariate analysis, in this section we will carry out a multivariate analysis which allows us to test the determinants of the acquiring-firm shareholders' valuation of the M&A announcement as a whole. Besides considering transaction and firm characteristics, we will also examine the influence of the family nature of the acquiring firms, as well as the legal and institutional environment of both the acquiring and the target firm.
Explanatory model of the acquiring-firm shareholders' valuation
The specification of the model to test the hypothesis is as follows: 
Results: determinants of the acquiring-firm shareholders' valuation
In this section we develop the cross-sectional regression analysis to examine the impact of family ownership on bidder abnormal return, considering the influence of the legal and institutional environment, as well as firm and transaction characteristics, as control variables.
The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return (-2, +2) for bidder shareholders at announcement. The explanatory variables are those described in the previous section. Table 8 shows the results of the regression analysis. The fact that the acquiring firm is a family firm has a positive and significant effect on the valuation made by bidder shareholders (models 1, 4, 5). This result is consistent with the "family firm efficiency in M&As"
hypothesis that we established previously. The long-term perspective of family firms and their lesser degree of manager-shareholder agency conflicts are in accordance with this result.
Shareholders do no perceive families as using M&As to obtain private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders, contrary to the "family firm opportunism in M&As" hypothesis.
We also find a non-monotonic relationship between the level of ownership concentration and acquiring firm abnormal returns. The ownership 2 variable has an expected negative and significant sign (Model 2). At higher concentrations of ownership by large shareholders, the relationship becomes negative (the entrenchment effect becomes dominant).The high correlation between family and ownership variables causes said variables to lose significance in Model 3.
Among the classic explanatory variables, the following results are significant: the fact of being a friendly takeover (FRIEND), which has a positive effect, and the existence of investment opportunities (MB), which has a negative effect, consistent with Moeller et al. (2004) .
The positive effect of the family variable is maintained when we incorporate the variables for the legal and institutional environment of both the acquiring and the target firm, as well as their difference (Table 8 shows the estimates defining institutional variables as differences between the environment of the bidder and that of the target firm). Among the institutional variables, only the difference in corruption control between the countries of the firms involved in the M&A is significant. This result is consistent with the possibility of shareholder wealth expropriation in the target firm country. The high correlation between the institutional variables and the family variable leads us to verify the significance of the interaction variable between both sets of variables (Table 9) . *, **, ***: statistically significant at the 90%, 95 % and 99 % confidence level, respectively. Table 9 reports the interaction between family and legal and institutional characteristics of the bidder country. We separately estimate 6 models, given the high correlation between the variables. When the bidder is a family firm, we observe a positive effect in the bidder shareholder valuation when its legal and institutional environment offers greater shareholder protection (Model 1), better accounting standards (Model 2), financial development (GDP) (Model 3) and corruption control (Model 5). In these environments, management-shareholder and majority-minority shareholder agency conflicts are less serious. Likewise, there is less operational risk in said environments. These results are consistent with the positive influence of family ownership in legal environments with better minority shareholder protection (Maury, 2006) . *, **, ***: statistically significant at the 90%, 95 % and 99 % confidence level, respectively.
We do not observe any differences in the results for other event windows of the cumulative abnormal return or for alternative definitions of legal and institutional environment variables (such as dummies).
Conclusions
This study explores the influence of family ownership on the abnormal return of European bidder firms, taking into account the legal environment of the acquiring firm and the possible differences with that of the country of the target firm.
(1) Family firm control may impose costs on minority shareholders, such as tunneling earnings or favoring sub-optimal investments. However, family ownership may enhance long-term strategies and diminish agency conflicts between shareholders and management. Our results are in accordance with a positive influence of family ownership on acquiring shareholder valuation of M&A announcements. Cumulative Average Abnormal Return, in (-2,+2), is 1.18% for the whole sample, 2.82% for family firms and 0.92% for non-family firms.
Multivariate Analysis, considering legal and institutional environment characteristics, also
shows that family ownership is a positive factor in bidder shareholder M&A valuation in environments with greater shareholder protection, better accounting standards, more financial development (GDP) and better corruption control.
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